

# Domain-based semi-supervised learning

Exploiting label invariance  
in unlabeled data  
from distributed cameras

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ICCV-IWDSC 2021



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# Who I am

- Scientist @ **Verizon Connect**, part of the Verizon group
- *Connected things* (vehicles, assets) for commercial customers (B2B)
- **Millions** of tracked items across the world with GPS and cameras
- Data science/ML group based in **Florence, Italy**



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# Semi-supervised learning

- Combine **supervised** and **unsupervised** learning
- Long history (see book by Chapelle), renewed interest in recent years (along with *self-supervised learning*)




# Recent successful approaches

## Different flavors & ingredients:

- self-training / pseudolabeling (teacher-student)
- consistency regularization
- aggressive data augmentations

See UDA, MixMatch, FixMatch, Meta Pseudo Labels in the last 2-3 years



FixMatch



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## A pragmatic perspective


Underlying assumption of SSL work: we know <sup>(almost)</sup> **nothing** about unlabeled examples

But.. is that true? Often we know a lot! We can **CHEAT** a little bit.

 Suprisingly often, we can find “**target consistent**” groups in our unlabeled data, where the label is *consistent*, although *unknown*.



## A few examples



Different point  
of views of the  
same scene



Spatially  
aligned  
images  
(same  
location)



Different images  
from the same  
device

Similar ideas have also been exploited for **self-supervised learning** approaches (e.g., Time-Contrastive Networks, Geography-Aware Self-supervised Learning)



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## DSSL core idea

For each batch:


N labeled examples

M target-consistent groups of unlabeled examples

Compute:

$$\mathcal{L} = \underbrace{\mathcal{L}_s}_{\text{standard supervised loss}} + \lambda_u \underbrace{\mathcal{L}_u}_{\text{unsupervised loss term (consistency) exploiting known invariants}}$$







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# Experiments

3 practical cases on distributed cameras + 1 bonus


# Weather classification

**Task:** classify weather in dashcam images

Thousands of unlabeled short videos




**Weather doesn't change locally:** frames from the same video are "target-consistent".



# Weather classification

SSL baseline  $\approx$  FixMatch “with no bells and whistles”



DSSL (kind of) works even with no data augmentation at all

	$B_u$	$K', K''$	Augmentation	Accuracy
DSSL	8	(4, 4)	RandAugment	<b>73.0</b>
SSL baseline	32	-	RandAugment	71.1
Supervised	-	-	RandAugment	68.2
<hr/>				
DSSL	8	(4, 4)	Weak	<b>70.9</b> (-2.1)
SSL baseline	32	-	Weak	68.2 (-2.9)
Supervised	-	-	Weak	66.1 (-2.1)
<hr/>				
DSSL	8	(4, 4)	None	<b>70.0</b> (-3.0)
SSL baseline	32	-	None	63.8 (-7.3)
Supervised	-	-	None	64.6 (-3.6)




# Ego-vehicle segmentation

**Task:** segment *ego-vehicle* in dashcam images

Millions of unlabeled images (internal dataset)

**Camera position doesn't change:** frames from the same device are "target-consistent".





# Vehicle classification

Streams of IMU + GPS data from connected vehicles

**Task:** what kind of vehicle generated the data? (10 classes)

For a subset of vehicles, we know make + model.  
Labeling *more* data is not possible!

**Vehicle type doesn't change:** data collected from the same device over time are "target-consistent".




Images from  
<https://www.fleetequipmentmag.com/making-sense-of-truck-classification/>

# Vehicle classification

These are not images: no **standard recipe** for data augmentations

We used strong augmentations for IMU+GPS data that worked well for other tasks (even self-supervised learning)

They're sufficient for DSSL, apparently not for the SSL baseline



## Bonus: CIFAR10 & CIFAR100 (proof of concept)

Standard setup: only use a subset as “labeled”

Assume an **oracle** can tell us, for each batch of unlabeled data, which samples belong to the same class (we're obviously cheating!)

Only <b>DSSL</b> uses the extra information	CIFAR10		CIFAR100	
	250 labels	4000 labels	2500 labels	10000 labels
DSSL *	<b>96.75</b> $\pm$ 0.28	<b>96.80</b> $\pm$ 0.03	<b>76.50</b> $\pm$ 0.02	<b>76.89</b> $\pm$ 0.01
FixMatch (RA) * <sup>†</sup>	94.30 $\pm$ 0.45	95.75 $\pm$ 0.05	66.51 $\pm$ 0.32	72.41 $\pm$ 0.13
Meta Pseudo Labels <sup>†</sup>	-	96.11 $\pm$ 0.07	-	-
FixMatch (CTA) <sup>†</sup>	94.93 $\pm$ 0.33	95.69 $\pm$ 0.15	71.36 $\pm$ 0.24	76.82 $\pm$ 0.11
MixMatch <sup>†</sup>	88.95 $\pm$ 0.86	93.58 $\pm$ 0.10	60.06 $\pm$ 0.37	71.69 $\pm$ 0.33
UDA <sup>†</sup>	91.18 $\pm$ 1.08	95.12 $\pm$ 0.18	66.87 $\pm$ 0.22	75.5 $\pm$ 0.25

**DSSL is a simple yet effective strategy to exploit domain knowledge in SSL**



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